Objectives. To assess whether Primary Care Emergency Preparedness Network member sites reported indicators of preparedness for public health emergencies compared with nonmember sites.The network-a collaboration between government and New York City primary care associations-offers technical assistance to primary care sites to improve disaster preparedness and response.
T he primary care sector has an essential role in public health emergency preparedness. Facilities providing primary care can directly augment and support crises medical surges because they routinely deliver clinical care for a large segment of the population across a broad spectrum of medical services. Primary care facilities and practitioners can also provide adequate medical evaluation and care during large-scale events that exceed the limits of the typical emergency medical infrastructure in an affected community. 1 In addition, in a public health emergency, primary care can assist hospital emergency departments with the appropriate disposition of patients who might require emergency care. Evident during the 2009 pandemic H1N1 influenza outbreak, primary care sites were used to reduce influenza caseload on hospitals' emergency departments by providing vaccines and medical professionals to care for patients. [2] [3] [4] Primary care sites must also be able to function after a disaster, continuing to provide care to the populations they serve as well as those displaced by the disaster. However, to do so, primary care centers must be prepared to handle emergencies and have plans in place to prepare for, respond to, and recover from disasters. Formed in 2009, the Primary Care Emergency Preparedness Network (PCEPN) is a pioneer cooperative partnership between the Community Health Care Association of New York State and Primary Care Development Corporation, which represents a coalition of primary care providers in the New York City metropolitan area. [5] [6] [7] Working in partnership with the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene and New York City Emergency Management, PCEPN's mission is to enhance the New York City primary care community's capacity to prepare for, respond to, and recover from man-made and natural disasters, and to facilitate primary care's representation in citywide planning and response. Currently, PCEPN has 49 member networks comprising more than 400 sites located across the 5 boroughs of New York City (Bronx, Brooklyn, Manhattan, Queens, and Staten Island).
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The PCEPN was established during the height of pandemic H1N1 influenza, when primary care sites provided medical surge capacity to dispense vaccines to the community. These activities underscored the important role primary care sites serve during a public health emergency. Primary care safety nets played an essential role in the pandemic influenza response by reducing the number of patients with H1N1 cared for in emergency department settings and by having individuals seek care at federally qualified health centers (FQHCs), which frequently serve underserved and uninsured populations. 2 To support providers' emergency management programs, PCEPN provides technical assistance, including emergency plan templates, training, and exercise development and facilitation. Through its efforts, PCEPN works to ensure that primary care is incorporated into citywide emergency planning, and during a citywide emergency it provides activation liaisons to staff the emergency support function 8 (public health and medical) emergency response desk when it is activated.
In addition, PCEPN supports information sharing among city agencies, the local health department, and New York City's primary care sector. They also provide situational awareness on primary care sector resources and needs before, during, and after disasters. The Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) Emergency Management Expectations for Health Centers describes 4 main expectations for health centers: (1) emergency management planning, (2) linkages and collaborations, (3) communications and information sharing, and (4) maintaining financial and operational stability. 8 To assist primary care sites in meeting these expectations, PCEPN was designed to (1) facilitate emergency preparedness in the primary care sector by providing technical assistance to primary care sites to better prepare for, respond to, and recover from disasters and (2) ensure that primary care is represented in citywide planning and response. 9 In infectious disease surveillance activities for the community, PCEPN represents the larger New York City's primary care sector. Participating primary care sites receive technical assistance with emergency management protocols and policies development, risk assessments, trainings, and disaster preparedness drills and exercises; they are also assessed to determine their level of preparedness to target technical assistance to sites on the basis of their needs. 11 ; or (4) FQHC "look-alike" organizations that provide primary care services but do not carry FQHC designation. [10] [11] [12] Membership of primary care sites in PCEPN is voluntary; there are no mandates or regulatory rules that bind primary care sites to participate in PCEPN.
The objective of this study was to conduct an evaluation of the PCEPN program by using collected baseline data, to compare member sites with nonmember sites on reported indicators of preparedness for public health emergencies, and to identify gaps in emergency preparedness to inform program development.
METHODS
In 2015, we developed a questionnaire to align with the HRSA Emergency Management Expectations for Health Centers, as well as US Department of Health and Human Services' Healthcare Preparedness Program emergency management capabilities for health care systems. 7, 8 We piloted the survey with 2 primary care sites. We selected these sites on the basis of their active participation in PCEPN initiatives, and their staff's feedback informed the final survey design. The final questionnaire included 77 items that addressed several health care preparedness domains: primary care site or clinic characteristics, emergency management plans, continuity of operations, training and exercises, and collaboration with external partners. Open-ended assessments addressed gaps in preparedness by allowing respondents to supply information (Appendix A, available as a supplement to the online version of this article at http://www.ajph.org).
We invited all 459 primary care sites identified in New York City's 5 boroughs to participate in the survey via e-mail of a link to the survey located at SurveyMonkey. 13 Throughout the survey administration period, Department of Health and Mental Hygiene staff sent 2 weekly reminder e-mail messages to potential respondents, and before the close of the survey availability period, they made reminder calls to the primary care network leads that had not replied. Stratified by PCEPN membership status, this included 136 primary care sites in the PCEPN network and 323 nonnetwork sites. We invited site leads to participate on the basis of contact information from the PCEPN membership list among members and on the basis of contact information of nonmembers in the New York State Department of Health Diagnostic and Treatment Centers' global list.
We conducted descriptive, bivariate, and multivariate analyses on the survey metrics with SAS software version 9.3 (SAS Institute Inc, Cary, NC). Descriptive statistics (median, mean, and SD) by PCEPN membership status of primary care site characteristics included patient volume, maximum patient volume, number of examination rooms, presence of clinical laboratory onsite, and clinical and nonclinical staffing. We used the Wilcoxon rank sum test to assess statistically significant differences between site characteristics by membership status.
To assess the impact of the PCEPN model on emergency preparedness of New York City primary care sites, we examined 4 elements of preparedness indicators as dependent variables: (1) whether the site had conducted a hazard vulnerability analysis (HVA); (2) whether the site had identified essential services for continuity of operations; (3) whether the site had any memoranda of understanding (MOU) in place with external partners for the transport and storage of vaccine; and (4) whether the site had completed point-ofdispensing (POD) training.
We estimated unadjusted risk ratios (RRs), or relative risk, and 95% confidence intervals (CIs) by using bivariate analyses with natural log-linked binomial models of the dependent variables (the "risk" of responding "yes" among members relative to nonmembers). We estimated adjusted RRs by using 2 multivariate natural logarithm-linked binomial models. Model 1 adjusted for presence of clinical laboratory onsite, number of examination rooms, clinical full-time-equivalent staff, and nonclinical full-time-equivalent staff. Model 2 adjusted for presence of clinical laboratory onsite and average number of daily patients seen at the primary care site.
We assessed perceived gaps in preparedness on the basis of responses to the following question: "Please provide us with the top three gaps you see within the [New York City] primary care sector's emergency preparedness or disaster management" (Appendix A) . We coded open-ended responses for quantitative analysis. We grouped the gaps identified by respondents into categories according to response themes and then organized them by the 5 most commonly identified preparedness gaps by PCEPN members, nonmembers, and overall.
RESULTS
Of 459 primary care sites invited to participate, 107 completed the survey, yielding a response rate of approximately 23.3%. Of 107 respondents, 60 sites (56.1%) were PCEPN members and 47 sites (43.9%) were nonmembers. Descriptive statistics for site characteristics are presented in Table 1 . Table 2 presents estimated adjusted RRs from 2 multivariate natural logarithm-linked binomial models in addition to the unadjusted RR for each of the 4 emergency preparedness measures. Risk ratios compared the risk of responding "Yes" to having the preparedness component in place among PCEPN members compared with nonmembers. The multivariate models adjust the RRs for primary care site scale and presence of clinical laboratory onsite (model 1) or practice size and presence of clinical laboratory onsite (model 2). All 4 preparedness components were significantly more likely to be in place among members compared with nonmembers in the bivariate analysis (P < .05); however, we observed a change in magnitude and significance for the adjusted RR. Both adjusted RR models for MOUs with external partners (model 1: RR = 1.94; 95% CI = 1.08, 3.49; model 2: RR = 1.86; 95% CI = 1.04, 3.34) and POD training completion (model 1: RR = 2.90; 95% CI = 1.38, 6.08; model 2: RR = 4.39; 95% CI = 1.78, 10.86) remained significant. Neither model produced RRs that were significant for HVA or continuity of operations. Table 3 presents results of the preparedness gaps identified by survey respondents. Both PCEPN member (48.8%) and nonmember (28.6%) responses cited the need for improved communication with internal and external stakeholders. Member (29.3%) and nonmember (25.0%) responses also indicated that their sites lacked sufficient resources to be sufficiently prepared for an emergency. Both nonmember (21.4%) and member (12.2%) responses indicated a need for emergency preparedness training. Importantly, more than 14% of nonmembers reported that their sites lacked any emergency plan whereas all members acknowledged having an emergency plan. Other areas identified for improvement among respondents included hazard mitigation, improved relationships with external partners, and POD training (data not shown).
DISCUSSION
The results of this study suggest that the PCEPN, a partnership between the local health department and primary care associations, is positively associated with emergency preparedness among participating sites. Results indicated that PCEPN members were more likely to have conducted an HVA to identify the likelihood and risks of potential hazards and threats that might have an impact on health centers' operations and demand for services. 8 In 2010 and 2015, PCEPN conducted sector-wide HVAs to improve appropriation of funding and resources and to identify facilities requiring specific types of emergency support. The goal of the HVA is to build emergency capability and capacity in primary care facilities. Primary care sites that participated in PCEPN were also more likely (at least without adjusting for scale or scope of practice) to have identified essential services for continuity of operations, which is 1 of the 4 components of the HRSA Emergency Management Expectations. 8 The HRSA guidance recommends that health centers should have continuity of operations plans to address strategies for resuming key functions that would enable the centers to fully conduct operations. 8 In addition, participants in PCEPN were more likely to have MOUs in place than were nonmember sites. This supports HRSA emergency management expectations for health centers to have linkages, collaborations, and partnerships with external community groups to increase resource allocations. 11 Furthermore, PCEPN members were more likely than were nonmembers to have completed POD emergency management training.
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These findings support the work of PCEPN and suggest that standardized approaches to preparedness should include primary care partners in public health emergency management planning. More work needs to be done to improve communications and information sharing. Additional resources (e.g., funding, training, staff support) are needed for primary care sites to prepare to meet the challenges of public health emergency response.
Limitations
This evaluative study is subject to several limitations. First, the survey response rate was low (23.3%). This low response rate presents an opportunity for introduction of nonresponse bias, and it was not possible to weight results to ameliorate any possible nonresponse bias. Results might therefore not be generalizable to the population of primary care sites in New York City. Second, respondents self-reported the data and we did not conduct in-person validation. Although the primary care network is considered the lead institution for a cohort of sites and satellite clinics governed by the same board, policies, and procedures, New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene had access to primary care network leads only.
Third, network leads might not have forwarded the survey invitation to appropriate site-level leadership. We recruited PCEPN nonmember respondents from the global list of New York State Department of Health Diagnostic and Treatment Centers that included primary care, dialysis, and specialty care centers. Finally, although causality was not established, there was a clear association between preparedness and PCEPN membership; member sites were significantly better prepared than were nonmember sites.
Conclusions
Partnership between public health and primary care is essential for effectively responding to and recovering from public health threats. 2, 4, 15 Therefore, model networks like PCEPN should continue to be supported and expanded. Primary care faces many challenges in preparing for emergencies including lack of resources and lack of communication with external stakeholders, such as public health agencies. 2, 4, 15 The findings of this study suggest that the PCEPN members may have access to coordination and collaboration with external partners, such as public health and emergency management, especially as PCEPN has representation in New York City's emergency management, public health, and medical desk (emergency support function 8) during activations. Members of PCEPN were more likely than were nonmembers to report partnering efforts (i.e., MOUs) and overall network preparedness might be indicative of the value of networks, such as PCEPN, to build collaborations through health care coalitions for advancing health care system preparedness.
To our knowledge, this is the first study to examine the association between public health preparedness and membership in a primary care coalition. Since the 9/11 attacks, local jurisdictions have been recipients of federal and state funding to enhance public health and health care system preparedness. The findings of this research will serve to inform future efforts to evaluate how funding streams are used to buttress community preparedness capability through public-private partnerships in health care. In addition, our findings suggest the development of models to engage and link health care facilities; public health and emergency response networks may streamline communication and support efficient utilization of resources for mounting a response. Finally, this research and methodology may inform future inquiry on related subject matter. Molinari also co-led the study design and conducted data analysis for this article. T. T. LeBlanc revised analysis and framed the results, and co-wrote the article. All authors collaborated to write the Discussion section. All reviewed and edited the entire article. Note. PCEPN = Primary Care Emergency Preparedness Network. Response to survey question, "Please provide us with the top 3 gaps you see within the primary care sector's emergency preparedness planning or disaster management."
